Nicole Wolkov, Riley Bailey, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, and George Barros

April 3, 2024, 8pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on April 3. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 4 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces appear to have increased the number and size of mechanized ground assaults on select sectors of the frontline within the past two weeks, marking a notable overall increase in Russian mechanized assaults across the theater. Ukrainian officials stated on March 20 that Ukrainian forces repelled a large Russian assault in the Lyman direction and published geolocated footage showing Ukrainian forces damaging or destroying several Russian armored vehicles east of Terny (west of Kreminna).[1] Ukrainian forces later defeated a battalion-sized Russian mechanized assault near Tonenke (west of Avdiivka) on March 30 to which Russian forces reportedly committed at least 36 tanks and 12 BMP infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs).[2] A Ukrainian serviceman stated that Ukrainian forces destroyed 12 Russian tanks and eight IFVs during the assault near Tonenke, and Russian forces have likely only conducted one other mechanized assault of that scale along the entire frontline since the beginning of the Russian campaign to seize Avdiivka in October 2023, which was also near Terny on January 20.[3] Geolocated footage published on April 3 shows Ukrainian forces repelling a roughly reinforced platoon-sized mechanized Russian assault near Terny.[4] The April 3 footage is likely recent and is distinct from the March 20 footage of Russian assaults near Terny. Russian forces may be intensifying mechanized assaults before muddy terrain becomes more pronounced in the spring and makes mechanized maneuver warfare more difficult. Russian forces may also be intensifying mechanized assaults to take advantage of Ukrainian materiel shortages before the arrival of expected Western security assistance.[5]

Russian forces may be intensifying the overall tempo of their offensive operations in Ukraine. The intensification of Russian mechanized assaults has occurred generally at the same time as intensified missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian energy facilities.[6] Russian forces escalated its strike campaign in Ukraine by beginning a new pattern of striking hydroelectric power plants around March 22, for example.[7] Russian forces may be intensifying strikes to further pressure the Ukrainian command to deploy air defense systems away from the front in order to more safely intensify aviation operations in support of ground operations.[8] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that Russian forces have been gradually moving materiel and personnel to frontline positions in small increments making it difficult for Ukrainian forces to monitor Russian force accumulations, suggesting that Russian forces have been preparing for larger-scale assault operations.[9] US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell stated on April 3 that the US assesses that Russia has “almost completely reconstituted militarily” over the past several months, suggesting that Russia is preparing and may already have sufficient manpower and materiel to significantly intensify ongoing offensive operations or initiate offensive efforts in new areas of the theater.[10]

Ukrainian sources continue to stress that the piecemeal and delayed arrival of new Western systems to Ukraine will allow Russian forces to adapt to and offset the likely operational benefits these systems would otherwise provide to Ukrainian forces. Politico Europe reported on April 3 that unspecified high-ranking Ukrainian military officers stated that provisions of new Western systems are arriving too late and in insufficient quantities to have maximally effective operational impacts on the battlefield.[11] The Ukrainian officers reportedly stated that Russian forces rapidly adapted to the marginal advantages that new Western-provided weapons systems provide, eliminating those advantages.[12] The Ukrainian officers reportedly pointed to the arrival of Western anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) and HIMARS as systems that arrived at the right time to help Ukrainian forces protect Kyiv in the early months of the full-scale invasion and liberate Kherson City in November 2022, respectively.[13] The Ukrainian officers stated that other Western-provided weapon deliveries have not been so timely, however. The officers reportedly stated that Russian forces are likely already optimizing Russia’s air defense network to counter the arrival of F-16 fighter aircraft, which are scheduled to arrive in Ukraine in the summer of 2024. Russian forces have shown the capacity to adapt to fighting in Ukraine both through mass as well as through steady, though uneven, operational, tactical, and technological.[14] The Russian military’s demonstrated ability to adapt, even if uneven or relatively slow, means that Ukrainian forces have a limited window of opportunity to maximally effectively use new Western systems to achieve operationally significant impacts. Individual systems pose specific challenges to Russian forces, and Russian forces would likely struggle to adapt as easily or quickly as they have previously if Ukrainian forces could employ several new systems at scale simultaneously. The arrival of new Western systems in a timely manner would likely allow Ukrainian forces to significantly degrade Russian forces and prevent even marginal Russian tactical gains while also providing Ukraine with capabilities necessary for operationally significant counteroffensive operations

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that the March 22 Crocus City Hall attack has caused a significant increase in Russian contract service applicants amid reported Russian efforts to increase force generation this spring. The Russian MoD claimed on April 3 that Russian military recruitment centers have documented a significant increase in the number of people applying for military service contracts throughout Russia.[15] The Russian MoD claimed that 16,000 Russian citizens have signed military service contracts over the past 10 days and emphasized that most applicants indicated that their main motive for signing a military contract was to “avenge” the victims of the Crocus attack. The Russian MoD claimed that more than 100,000 Russians have signed military service contracts since the beginning of 2024. Kremlin officials and mouthpieces have consistently attempted to falsely implicate Ukraine in the Crocus attack. If accurate, the Russian MoD's claim suggests that the Kremlin’s information operation may have been successful.[16] The fear and instability that the Islamic State’s (IS) attack created in Russian society may have spurred some Russian citizens to sign up for military service. The Russian MoD may alternatively be running a simultaneous information operation designed to portray Russians as increasingly signing military contracts for revenge to further convince others to sign contracts and justify its long-term war effort in Ukraine.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on April 3 that Russia is preparing to “mobilize” an additional 300,000 personnel on June 1.[17] Zelensky may be referring to Russia’s ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts or efforts to increase contract service applications following the March 22 Crocus City Hall attack, but Zelensky is likely not referring to another wave of Russian partial mobilization akin to Russia’s September 2022 partial mobilization. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on March 22 that high-ranking Russian officials stated that the Russian MoD plans to increased force generation starting in the spring and that Russia may intend to generate an additional 300,000 personnel within an unspecified time frame.[18] Russian authorities continue to deny Russian and Ukrainian claims about an imminent Russian partial or general mobilization order, and ISW continues to assess that Russian authorities would likely intensify crypto-mobilization efforts before deciding to conduct another unpopular wave of mobilization.[19]

Republic of Tatarstan Head Rustam Minnikhanov warned that Russian companies and local authorities must defend themselves against Ukrainian drone strikes and not rely on Russian air defenses following the April 2 Ukrainian strikes on Russian military production and oil refinery infrastructure in Tatarstan. Minnikhanov stated on April 3 that “there is no need to wait for [Russian] missile defense to work...we must decide on our own, every enterprise, every municipality, every city.”[20] Minnikhanov stated that Russians should “wake up” and realize that “no one will protect you except yourself.” Russian military sources recently told Russian state outlet Izvestia that the Russian military is forming mobile fire groups to combat Ukrainian drones, indicating that Russia may be unable to deploy conventional air defense systems to defend all of Russia’s critical facilities.[21] ISW assessed that Ukraine’s April 2 strikes on targets in Tatarstan likely represent a significant inflection in Ukraine’s ability to conduct long-range strikes far into rear Russian areas.[22] Minnikhanov’s statement is likely a reflection of increased Russian concern following the April 2 strikes and is a clear acknowledgment and admonition of the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) failure to defend Russian cities and critical infrastructure from Ukrainian drone strikes.

Russian-backed former Ukrainian separatist politician Oleg Tsaryov complained on April 3 that no current Russian political party adequately represents the political interests of Russian ultranationalists, highlighting a possible source of discontent between the pro-Russian ultranationalist community and the Kremlin. Tsaryov responded to a recent claim by Patriarch Kirill, the head of the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church, that there is an absence of Russian nationalism in Russian politics, stating that Russian nationalism and demands for the Kremlin to implement nationalist ideals are increasing.[23] Tsaryov claimed that an official nationalist political party could provide the nationalists with a legal avenue through which to pursue policy changes without discrediting themselves and allow more radical nationalists to work with the mainstream nationalists, presumably as part of a Russian nationalist political coalition.[24] Now-imprisoned ardent nationalist Igor Girkin previously founded the Angry Patriot’s Club, his failed initiative to provide fringe Russian ultranationalists with a platform that directly opposed Russian President Vladimir Putin’s regime and conduct of the war in Ukraine.[25] Tsaryov’s call for an official nationalist political party highlights a grievance that mainstream Russian ultranationalist milbloggers may develop over the long term as Putin aims to further increase control over the ultranationalist information space and fails to implement some of their desired political changes.[26] Putin likely aims to suppress any possible ultranationalist political movement that could oppose his regime as he did with the Angry Patriots by having Girkin arrested.[27] Notably, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war of conquest against Ukraine is insufficiently nationalist for Tsaryov.

Ukraine and Finland signed a 10-year bilateral security agreement on April 3.[28] Finland also announced a new military aid package to Ukraine worth 188 million euros (about $204 million) that includes air defense materiel and large-caliber artillery ammunition.[29]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces appear to have increased the number and size of mechanized ground assaults on select sectors of the frontline within the past two weeks, marking a notable overall increase in Russian mechanized assaults across the theater.
• Russian forces may be intensifying the overall tempo of their offensive operations in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian sources continue to stress that the piecemeal and delayed arrival of new Western systems to Ukraine will allow Russian forces to adapt to and offset the likely operational benefits these systems would otherwise provide to Ukrainian forces.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that the March 22 Crocus City Hall attack has caused a significant increase in Russian contract service applicants amid reported Russian efforts to increase force generation this spring.
• Republic of Tatarstan Head Rustam Minnikhanov warned that Russian companies and local authorities must defend themselves against Ukrainian drone strikes and not rely on Russian air defenses following the April 2 Ukrainian strikes on Russian military production and oil refinery infrastructure in Tatarstan.
• Russian-backed former Ukrainian separatist politician Oleg Tsaryov complained on April 3 that no current Russian political party adequately represents the political interests of Russian ultranationalists, highlighting a possible source of discontent between the pro-Russian ultranationalist community and the Kremlin.
• Ukraine and Finland signed a 10-year bilateral security agreement on April 3.
• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Bakhmut and Donetsk City and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.
• Russian authorities continue to expand social benefits for Russian military personnel.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-3-2024

Russia increasing the tempo of attacks, something they did last year as well.  With the Ukrainians holding back their strength to prepare for their 2024 offensive, we will have to see how well they can resist the Russian efforts.

Interesting analysis indicating that the advantages gained by superior Western weapon systems are eventually eroded by Russian adaptations.  While they are still effective weapons, this again emphasises the downside of Ukraine's decision to remain relatively passive in 2023 - lets hope Russian reactive innovations, such as they are, not make a decisive difference in 2024.